UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE: THE TALK CONTINUES

By Robert Keatley, Editor, October 2007

The year’s third quarter opened with Chinese President Hu Jintao swearing in Donald Tsang for a full five-year term as Chief Executive shortly after thousands of Hong Kong citizens staged their annual demonstration to urge faster progress toward universal suffrage in local elections, something President Hu views with distrust.

It ended with candidates preparing for a December 2 by-election on Hong Kong island for the Legislative Council (Legco) seat thrown open by the death of Ma Lik, leader of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), the largest political party reflecting Beijing’s policies. Former Chief Secretary Anson Chan Fang On-sang, representing the pro-democracy forces, and former Secretary of Security Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee, expected to have the central government’s support, are the main contenders.

In between, the government released its official Green Paper on Constitutional Development, designed to promote public discussion leading to a more open political system in Hong Kong. But the complex paper, with scores of variations about the style and substance of political change, gained limited enthusiasm from either the general public or activists who seek full voting rights more quickly. The paper had mainly “a dulling and sleep-inducing effect,” wrote one leading analyst. “It is not designed to inform or to provoke thinking.”

Thus it wasn’t clear just how far along the summer months had moved Hong Kong toward universal suffrage—the stated goal of all involved parties. In his July 1 remarks, President Hu emphasized that political changes must be “gradual”, with the interests of “one country” outranking those of the “two systems” that set Hong Kong apart from the mainland in certain ways. Assorted statements from local politicians who claim to speak for Beijing suggested nothing substantive will change before 2017, and perhaps not until much later. A recurring theme from such spokesman is that too many HKSAR voters aren’t yet “patriotic” enough to be trusted with the ballot—meaning that they might not reliably support Beijing’s choices.

Through all this, there seemed to a growing realization that political change is not likely to come any faster than Beijing chooses, and that the heady days of mass pro-democracy demonstrations in recent years may have been misleading. Keeping control remains the first priority of the Chinese Communist Party, with avoiding risks its corollary. Although explicit explanations aren’t forthcoming, it appears that Beijing fears completely free local elections might bring in a populist government, perhaps disrupting the local capitalist economy through costly social welfare plans and high taxes—while also setting an unwanted precedent for mainland provinces. Democratic politicians say such fears are unwarranted because Hong Kong’s voters are basically conservative and want to preserve the basic social and economic structures that have created so much local wealth. They might tinker at the margins on such matters as health care or pensions but would never vote radicals into power, these activists maintain.

That message, however true, does not seem to be accepted in Beijing. Some of Hong Kong’s more pessimistic political activists worry that China’s reluctance may be a deliberate longterm stall, designed to prevent fundamental change before 2047 when the 50-year “one country, two systems” policy officially ends. At that point, Beijing could impose the political system of its choice without violating any agreements.

The economy, meantime, continued to prosper. The government raised its official growth forecast for 2007 to 6% as tourism, shipping and retailing, among other things, expanded. The stock market boomed amid expectations that rivers of Chinese money would soon flow in, thanks to a policy change on the mainland. There were worries about rising inflation and the widening gap between rich and poor, but no serious threats were in sight. Rising revenues gave the government a larger-than-expected budget surplus of HK$58.6 billion (US$7.6 billion) for the fiscal year.

At least two other concerns continued to earn public attention. One is a growing interest in Hong Kong’s heritage, a desire to spare old buildings and other familar sites from the wrecking ball. Public protests earlier this year against demolishing the Star Ferry terminal on Hong Kong island—a building of little architectural merit—were surprisingly strong; many people apparently didn’t want to say farewell to a 1950s facility they’d known since youth so that another freeway could be built. The protests failed but new efforts followed to save, among other things, one of the last Chinese-style mansions, old buildings at Po Shan temple, the Queen’s Pier in Central and the Wan Chai market, the last of Hong Kong’s Bauhaus-style markets. Most of these also had limited success but the government now concedes a need to be more respectful of the city’s remaining historical sites and work harder at preservation.

Much more intense were continuing complaints about the environment, notably air pollution. Particulary high pollution over a mid-September weekend caused special concern; the government’s rating index termed it “very high” and urged children and old people to stay indoors. Among other things, high pollution levels caused the Chinese International School to cancel its annual swimming meet. This followed earlier claims by Edward Yau Tang-wah, the environment secretary, that government cleanup efforts were working and that the skies were getting bluer—a claim that left “green groups...gasping at his audacity,” the South China Morning Post reported.

There were continuing worries that pollution might impact Hong Kong’s economic future; there’s fear that unhealthy living conditions may drive foreign finnancial firms elsewhere, endangering the city’s role as an international financial center. A survey of American Chamber of Commerce members found that 60% said their companies are likely to invest in other places due to local pollution. It also found that 83% knew people who were thinking of leaving, or had already left, because of the environment. And 51% said they had problems recruiting people overseas to fill Hong Kong jobs for the same reason. Another report said two hedge funds already have emigrated to Singapore because managers were worried about their children’s health, while a third fund decided against a basing itself in Hong Kong due to environmental concerns.

The government is planning various measures to improve the quality of local life, but the benefits will come slowly. In coming months, there will be increased mandatory use of higher quality diesel fuel in trucks and of LPG by taxis, for example, while tax concessions will encourage people to buy cars that emit fewer pollutants. There also may be restrictions on the construction of new high-rise buldings to reduce the so-called “wall effect” that restricts air flow and traps pollutants. But opposition to those measures has already surfaced; Li Ka-shing, whose companies are responsible for some of the city’s largest buildings, warned that such rules could damage the local economy.

The December 2 by-election, if Mrs. Chan wins, would immediately strengthen the hand of democratic forces in Legco. However, what emerges from the Green Paper process will be much more important to the city’s political future, and those results are many months away. The official public consultation period ends October 10, to be followed by an adminstration review of proposals received. After that, it hopes to put forward what it deems to be a consensus view about how to move toward universal suffrage, subject to modification, for eventual approval by the general public and both the Hong Kong and Beijing governments

The Green Paper considers several basic issues. One is the size of the nominating committee that chooses candidates for the post of chief executive. At present, it consists of 800 members who mostly represent establishment groups and generally go along with whatever Beijing desires. The choices set forth include making this committee smaller, such as by having it consist of the 60 Legco members; keeping it at 800; or expanding it to 1200-1600 members. Whatever the size, how members are chosen is the key; it’s believed Beijing wants to retain indirect control of the election committee process to ensure that no candidates it deems unacceptable are allowed to compete.

A related issue concerns the number of candidates permitted to run—the Green Paper’s choices are 10 or more, eight at most or two to four. There is agreement, however, that the final vote will be by universal suffrage rather than, as at present, by a ballot of only the 800-member nominating committee. Other proposals involve Legco—for example, should it abandon the functional constituency (indirect) elections which fill half the seats, or retain them with a revised electoral method?

Just as crucial is the matter of timing. Pro-democratic forces have been demanding a firm timetable, preferably with universal suffrage for all elections by 2012 but with the date subject to negotation if other terms are acceptable. The Green Paper options are for one-person, one-vote elections in 2012, by 2016 for Legco and 2017 for chief executive, or in later years. Those sympathetic to Beijing often say an early date is not desirable. For example, casino billionaire Stanley Ho Hung-sun has called efforts to set a 2012 date “useless” because “Beijing will [give a date] at a suitable time...when most of you are patriotic and love Hong Kong.”

The eventual form of election involving universal suffrage remains impossible to predict. The one certainty is that Chief Executive Tsang has promised to resolve the issue before his term expires in 2012.