Universal Suffrage is on the Way—But Much Too Slowly for the Democrats

By Robert Keatley, Editor, January 2008

The year 2007 ended with Beijing’s most important decision yet about the political future of Hong Kong, but one that yet again delayed the introduction of full local democracy. It left many crucial details unresolved and also left pan-democratic forces in Hong Kong complaining about the continued slow pace toward universal suffrage. Intense disputes about how to implement these newly-authorized political changes seem unavoidable during the next several years.

The decision came December 29 by a vote of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, the country’s legislature. After receiving recommendations from Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, the committee ruled in secret session that Hong Kong “may” use universal suffrage to choose a new chief executive in 2017 and also “may” do the same for all Legislative Council (Legco) seats in 2020—not just for the 50% currently chosen by free votes in geographic constituencies. But the NPC also decreed that scheduled 2012 voting for all offices must be conducted basically under existing rules, though some less sweeping reforms will be sought. Democratic parties have made repeated calls for completely free elections by that date, and are continuing to do so even though Beijing clearly has ruled it out.

The NPC decision also imposed other conditions. Candidates for chief executive in 2017 and subsequent years still must be approved by an official (presumably Beijing-dominated) election committee “in accordance with democratic procedures” before their names can appear on the ballot, as is now the case, though the future system need not be a carbon copy of today’s version. Specifically, the Standing Committee decision said it “is of the view” that “a broadly representative nominating committee shall be formed...with reference to” the existing system for choosing committee members. But the ruling clearly anticipates competitive races from 2017 onward, for it states the committee “shall...nominate a certain number of candidates” for the top government office.

All this leaves many important details for later decision by Hong Kong itself. Included are the size of the election committee (now 800 members), the method of choosing its members, the number of commitee votes needed by a prospective candidate to win a ballot place (currently 100) and how many office-seekers will be allowed to compete. Settling these and related issues seem certain to cause contentious political disputes starting in 2008.

The NPC references to future Legco elections also leave many important details to be settled later. But they appear to allow—though not guarantee—significant liberalization of the current law-making system from 2020 onward. For one thing, the decision says that all Legco seats “may” be filled by universal suffrage; at present, half of the 60 members must be chosen by interest groups (called functional constituencies) that usually reflect Beijing’s policy choices. The NPC also invited Hong Kong to revise legislative procedures in ways that would give Legco more responsibility; at present, it cannot initiate bills that affect government spending. And the NPC ruling appears to weaken slightly the ability of indirectly-elected members to block legislation to bring about these changes.

However, none of these revisions can take effect without NPC approval. A future Hong Kong chief executive (Mr. Tsang will leave office in 2012) must submit such proposals to the Standing Committee for “a determination thereon” before they become law, according to the December 29 decision.

Not surprisingly, Mr. Tsang welcomed the NPC action. “We are grateful....[I]t sets a clear timetable for electing the chief executive and legislators,” he said. “We must treasure this hard-earned opportunity.” Earlier in December, he had warned that while most Hong Kong citizens want universal suffrage sooner, opposition from a significant minority made it unlikely to happen before 2017.

Also not surprisingly, pro-democracy activists complained about slow progress toward universal suffrage, the “ultimate” goal that all sides agreed upon years ago. In a joint statement, Hong Kong’s pan-democratic political parties asked Beijing “to respect the wishes of Hong Kong people”, reverse its decision and move toward free voting more quickly. Most public opinion polls say a majority of the Hong Kong populace does want universal
suffrage as soon as 2012, though the same polls also found that most people would accept 2017 if Beijing ruled out the earlier date.

In the end, the NPC rejected fast changes though it didn’t offer convincing explanations about for its caution. Many analysts cite several factors. One is the Chinese Communist Party’s historical reluctance to take political risks that might give power to forces it cannot control; some party officials fear that Hong Kong residents—if given the chance—could choose leaders or policies that would act against China’s interests, though there is little evidence to support that view. Some mainland sources even cite the separatist movement in Taiwan as an example of what they want to prevent, despite no hint of anything similar inside Hong Kong. Prompted by their friends in Hong Kong’s business community, Beijing officials also oppose giving power to populist movements that might raise taxes and introduce costly social welfare programs. (For the most part, Communists and capitalists have teamed up to oppose introducing local democracy anytime soon.) Finally, Beijing may worry that free voting in Hong Kong would set an example that it doesn’t want other Chinese cities and provinces to emulate. Although China’s current leaders talk about introducing democracy on the mainland much more often than did their predecessors, they define it narrowly. Under terms laid down by the NPC, Hong Kong won’t gain the free vote until after President Hu Jintao and his colleagues have left office.

Although Mr. Tsang’s successor likely will be the one who forwards basic electoral revisions for NPC action, Mr. Tsang himself will seek more limited modifications for the 2012 voting. Included could be an expansion of Legco to 70 seats (though half would still be indirectly elected) and increasing the size of the Election Commission, perhaps to 1600. He may also try to revise the composition of functional constituencies to make them somewhat more representative. “We hope this would lay a solid foundation for attaining universal suffrage” in subsequent years, he said.

In fact, Mr. Tsang is under orders to do so. Qiao Xiaoyang, deputy secretary general of the Standing Committee, warned that this interim step is a necessary stage of the political transition and that democratic forces must abandon efforts to bring about full voting rights any sooner. “...if their demands are way over the top, people will only question what they really want,” he said.

The NPC decision came only four weeks after Hong Kong’s most important Legco by-election to date. On December 2, Anson Chan On-sang, former chief secretary of the government (the number two position), defeated Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee, former secretary for security, by a 55% to 43% margin in the Hong Kong island constituency. Mrs. Chan was backed by the pan-democrats while Mrs. Ip had support from pro-Beijing and business groups in an election called to fill a seat left vacant by the death of the previous officeholder. The contest drew a large turnout, and was widely seen as a successful test of the democrats’ strength in the face of highly-organized opposition. However, there was some disappointment over Mrs. Chan’s failure to get 60% of the total vote—a figure that many democrats thought would prove that a consensus exists for faster progress toward a one-person, one-vote system that abolishes functional constituencies.

The previous month, on November 19, elections for 405 seats on Hong Kong’s 18 district councils saw the main pro-Beijing party—the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB)—make a major comeback from big losses four years earlier. In 2003, voters had punished it for supporting the unpopular Tung Chee Wah as chief executive, for an economic downturn that Beijing had not helped correct and for government efforts to pass security legislation that threatened civic rights. Since then, China has acted to boost the local economy, the more popular Mr. Tsang became head of the government and security bills were put aside. In addition, most pro-democracy parties proved no match for a revived DAB at ground-level politics—providing constituency services that earn voter loyalty.

Thus the DAB nearly doubled its elected seats to 115, while pan-democratic parties finished with 106, down about 50%. Since then, Mr. Tsang has exercised his right to appoint 102 additional members, guaranteeing that the democrats are in the minority on all 18 district councils.

This may reflect an overall strategy. Some political scientists believe the Hong Kong administration, working with Chinese officials, is trying to turn the DAB into a pro-government majority party—perhaps modeled after the ruling party in Singapore—that would guarantee no future electoral surprises. An October decision to add two new layers of senior political appointees to policy-making bureaus may be part of this effort. These 24 new jobs are supposed to go to candidates from outside the civil service, giving political activists practical experience in government affairs. Hong Kong officials have stressed that loyalty to official policies, not competence, will be the first criterion; some see this as a jobs and training program for DAB members.

Carrying out such a program will be easier if the Hong Kong economy continues to prosper as in recent years. The annual growth rate remains near 6% while unemployment is at a 10-year low. A leading growth engine continues to be the financial sector, which provides skilled jobs in banking, accounting, management and other services, especially for companies with mainland operations. As the DAB proved in the recent district council elections, pro-Beijing parties can win broad support if they get the precinct politics right during prosperous times.

One sign of Hong Kong affluence is an exodus of some leading financial firms from costly Central District quarters to new office blocks in Kowloon, an area they previously avoided. The leading symbol of this trend is the International Commerce Center, which will be Hong Kong’s tallest building at 115 floors when completed. In addition to having a huge shopping mall and a Ritz Carlton hotel, such major firms as Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley and Deutsche Bank will begin moving in this year.