TAIWAN, HONG KONG AND THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION

By Suzanne Pepper
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Among the many anniversaries being commemorated in 2009, none evoke a stronger mix of political emotions among Chinese leaders, whatever their loyalties, than the historic dates associated with Taiwan. Home to the anti-communist Republic of China (ROC) government since 1949, Taiwan is the last living reminder of a civil war that began in the 1920s, eventually involved the United States, and left the two main Chinese adversaries in a standoff that has continued for 60 years. But 2009 is not just a time for remembering fallen heroes and decision-makers who kept the peace by renewing its guarantees in 1979. Excitement is heightened by a pervasive sense that this historic drama has now entered its final phase—even if some of the contemporary players in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington cannot yet acknowledge the inevitable, much less discuss its real-life implications.

Such reticence derives from an abundance of political caution because the issues at stake still provoke a potentially combustible mix of ambition, pride, disappointment and fear. The inevitable is national unification, a now standard but disembodied assumption evident throughout the mainland and Hong Kong media. As for specifics, these too are assumed without elaboration. Hong Kong’s “one-country, two-systems” formula is the only realistic means of creating a unified Chinese state and is routinely recommended for its beneficial properties by international practitioners everywhere. But that formula has already been raised and rejected for Taiwan, while its long-term implications are still too sensitive for public discussion even in Hong Kong itself.

History of a Holding Pattern

Although the United States did not intervene directly in the main 1945-49 battles, Washington undertook to protect its World War II ally, Chiang Kai-shek, after he led the remnants of his defeated Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist army across the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. undertook to maintain the status quo thereafter, standing between Chiang’s declared aim of retaking the mainland and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) desire to defeat him once and for all. Thirty years passed before Washington shifted diplomatic recognition from the Nationalist government in Taipei to its People’s Republic of China (PRC) successor in Beijing, but even then the status quo remained intact. Also in 1979, the U.S. replaced recognition with a Taiwan Relations Act, which obligated Washington to protect Taiwan in the event of armed attack or coercion by the mainland.

On the surface, the strategic Beijing-Taipei-Washington triangle remains in the same 60-year-old holding pattern. The U.S. continues to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan and Beijing has used the standoff as an excuse to strengthen its military capabilities far in excess of those needed to accomplish Beijing’s aim of “liberating” the island by force if necessary. In reality, the U.S. would like nothing better than to see this impasse find a peaceful solution. Toward that end, changes in the Beijing-Taipei relationship have undergone so swift a transformation during the past 12 months that there is now probably no turning back.

Present Realities

The changes are a culmination of two fast-paced reform movements on either side of the Taiwan Strait. In 1979, Beijing had just begun recalibrating from the Marxist-inspired goal of revolutionizing Chinese society to capitalist-inspired alternatives. A decade later the CCP seemed destined for oblivion along with all its European counterparts. Today the new direction is firmly established and has made China a major player in the globalized economy as well as creditor to the debt-ridden U.S. government. Equally important, the new direction and its economic achievements have been used to create an adaptation of Marxist infallibility that now justifies the CCP’s claim to a permanent monopoly over political power. 

After some demoralized floundering, leaders and theoreticians combined a mix of old and new ideas, and the old revolutionary hymn is their theme song: “Without the Communist Party There Would Be No New China.” The meaning is clear to all Chinese whatever their political inclinations. It evokes the compelling memory of a nation that has been determined since the overthrow of the last imperial dynasty a century ago to restore the once-invincible strength of a people humiliated by the unwanted attentions of Western intruders and Japanese invaders.

China’s 20th century quest for wealth and power has been driven by this sense of manifest destiny and current party leaders are now declaring themselves masters of that national mission, interpreted specifically to include the return of all detached and disputed territories. All forms of public information are saturated with this political message and all others are blocked. The result is a powerful force of mass patriotism that has become one of the party’s most jealously guarded political assets. Another is the unified constitutional order whereby the party exercises its monopoly of power and enforces laws designed to perpetuate it.

In Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek’s son Chiang Ching-kuo set in motion political reforms that did not necessarily transform all KMT adherents into liberal democrats. But the reforms did lift martial law, legalize the local opposition movement rooted in decades of opposition to the rule of KMT mainland migrants, and allow competitive elections. These culminated in the 2000 presidential election when opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian unexpectedly emerged victorious.

The “inner” history of this political transformation has yet to be written but it is possible to speculate on strategic motivations. These can be traced to the early 1980s, when KMT leaders were assessing their prospects and concluding that henceforth they must rely primarily on their own wits and political stratagems for protection because American promises would inevitably be compromised by improving U.S.-China ties. Hence making peace with resentful Taiwanese became a necessity, as did dialogue with the mainland. The former led in 1992 to the first fully democratic election, for Taiwan’s legislature; the latter produced, also in 1992, a controversial “consensus” whereby the two sides allegedly agreed that there is but “one China.” This was intended to set aside the difficult question of competing PRC/ROC claims to sovereignty over the nation as a whole, while Beijing and Taipei dealt with practical matters of mutual benefit like transport, trade, and cross-Strait investment.

It is possible to speculate further that Taiwan’s KMT then-president Lee Teng-hui decided he needed a stronger political stratagem once the Clinton administration did its about face, in 1994, and decided to downplay political irritants  for the sake of economic relations.1 In any case, the Taiwan-born Lee began strengthening his own Taiwanese power base at that time by creatively spinning the 1992 consensus to reflect local demands for stronger protection against a precipitous negotiated settlement spurred by the KMT’s mainland veterans. Chen Shui-bian’s 2000 election victory was the unintended consequence and his two-term presidency was marked by the fractious pursuit of those demands. Meanwhile, the veterans responded to his surprise re-election in March 2004 by ignoring him and proceeding on their own to do exactly what he was trying to prevent.

1. In April 2005, KMT chairman Lien Chan made his historic journey to China where he concluded an agreement with Chinese President Hu Jintao reaffirming the 1992 consensus. The agreement then became the basis of KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou’s platform in the March 2008 presidential election. Ma won 58.45% of the vote, giving the KMT’s negotiating agenda something it had never enjoyed before: a popular mandate.2  Opportunities like this may not return and the new KMT-CCP partnership is rushing to implement the 2005 accord. Its contents were: resume mainland-Taiwan negotiations; end the formal state of hostilities and reach a peace accord; promote economic cooperation; promote Taiwan’s participation in international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), which China had blocked; and establish regular CCP-KMT contact. 3

 

During the past year, progress has been made on these points with record speed. And there is more. Soon after leaving office, Chen Shui-bian was arrested for corruption and is currently being tried on charges that could result in life imprisonment. He is thus being treated to some old-fashioned Chinese justice, the political significance of which is clear to all. Corruption may be the excuse, as it often is in such high-profile cases, but the aim is both to discredit him personally and, by implication, the cause he espoused.

Finessing a Hong Kong-Style Solution?       

Ma Ying-jeou did not, of course, campaign solely on the basis of the 2005 accord. His motto—“no unification, no independence, no war”—aimed to reassure the majority of Taiwan residents who respond similarly in most opinion polls. This majority wants neither independence nor unification with the mainland but prefers instead the status quo.4 It must therefore be assumed that in March 2008, the majority assumed it was voting for the best of both worlds: profitable peaceful cross-Strait relations and the current separate governing arrangements. The question now for the people of Taiwan is whether they can have their cake and eat it too.

The main thrust of the new CCP-KMT partnership is to woo Taiwan with the benefits of economic integration plus not-so-subtle cultural exchanges designed to celebrate shared Chinese traditions and negate the sense of a separate Taiwanese identity that Chen Shui-bian tried to foster. The effort is like that used to quiet Hong Kong’s nerves before its return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, nor does Beijing try to hide its overriding objective. With the KMT government standing by as facilitator, Beijing’s every act and pronouncement is aimed at preparing public opinion for unification.

In Washington, Ma Ying-jeou’s election was initially greeted with relief. Not everyone was convinced that Beijing would activate its threat to use armed force or that Chen Chui-bian would ever declare independence. But 1,000 missiles pointed in Taiwan’s direction, and Beijing’s new 2005 Anti-Secession Law authorizing their use, focused minds on Taiwan Relations Act obligations. Less than a year after Ma Ying-jeou took office, however, the sudden cross-Strait embrace is prompting some second thoughts.

Calls have begun for a Taiwan Policy Review, the first since 1994, to assess the new situation. The question for Washington is whether it can make any difference because everyone’s wish is coming true: Beijing and Taipei are working things through on their own. Some immediate suggestions focus on strengthening Taiwan’s international standing and military preparedness, but both options are preempted by the 2005 agreement. Beijing agreed to the former and has just dropped its objections to WHO observer status for Taiwan, a gesture clearly contingent on Beijing’s sovereign authority. The 2005 peace accord proposal would eliminate altogether the need for Taiwan Relations Act protection. 5

If the present course continues, any realistic Taiwan Policy Review must therefore anticipate Beijing’s ultimate objective and the conditions under which unification might be achieved. Ma Ying-jeou has said that the people of Taiwan themselves must consent, but holding a referendum for the purpose may not be to everyone’s liking given the anxiety aroused by Chen Chui-bian’s moves in that direction. Beijing meanwhile is relying on more familiar ways. Even though Hong Kong’s two-systems formula was rejected by earlier KMT administrations, Beijing continues to press its suit while trying to woo the public first with economic sweeteners and cultural exchanges. Next should come political discussions and military exchanges, says Beijing, the aim being “complete national unification.” 6 Hence any realistic Taiwan Policy Review must also revisit Hong Kong and the results will present a troubling scenario.

Complacency is an Issue

The main problem with Hong Kong’s two-systems formula is the complacency it fosters.  The conditions have been clearly stated since the Basic Law constitution was promulgated in 1990. Article 5 distinguishes between China’s “socialist system and policies” and Hong Kong’s “capitalist system and way of life,” which “shall remain unchanged for 50 years.” Until recently everyone assumed that by the mid-21st century, global trends would have diluted the most dangerous features of communist dictatorship.  That may still happen. But for now, party leaders have succeeded in reinforcing their monopoly hold on power and Hong Kong is being prepared to join that system in its present state. The two-systems formula should therefore be seen not as a permanent solution but only as a transitional arrangement leading to full political integration.

Among many indicators that signal the advance of CCP-led governance, Macau’s new national security law stands out both for its content (analyzed elsewhere in this issue) and the circumstances surrounding its promulgation in February this year. Hong Kong and neighboring Macau have similar Basic Law constitutions and both contain Article 23 mandates to pass national security legislation. Hong Kong aborted the first attempt after 500,000 angry residents took to the streets in protest on July 1, 2003. But the acceleration of Beijing’s direct involvement in Hong Kong governance became apparent from that date and Beijing has not, as hoped, modified its interpretation of the Article 23 mandate.  On the contrary, that interpretation has been reaffirmed with a well-orchestrated strategy designed to pass the legislation first in politically quiescent Macau, thereby setting a precedent for Hong Kong to follow reportedly sometime before 2012.

The Macau law is also not, as advertised, a “lite” version of Hong Kong’s 2003 draft but is only more concise, albeit with all the key proscriptions intact. It is, in fact, a streamlined composite of China’s own national security and state secrets laws. These serve as the linchpin of Beijing’s governing system by criminalizing the kinds of critical challenges to political authority, institutions, policies and personnel via all the various means of political expression including speech, publication, association and information- gathering that Hong Kongers have until recently taken for granted as part of their guaranteed “way of life.”

Other indications of Beijing’s intentions include: the refusal to allow universal suffrage elections for the legislature until 2020; reneging on earlier promises that decisions to hold such elections would be made locally; community-wide national patriotic education that introduces concepts heretofore little-known in Hong Kong, like the Chinese constitution’s proviso for universal suffrage under CCP rule as an alternative to Western-style adversarial democracy; a lower tier of 18 District Councils that is beginning to look like the lowermost rung of China’s CCP-led People’s Congress system; the assertion of Beijing’s “substantive” right to make all the top appointments in Hong Kong’s government; and an “underground” or unacknowledged local CCP branch that is acknowledged in all but name.7 Beijing could have loosened the bonds on any one of these points. In particular, Beijing might have allowed Macau’s new law to decouple national and political security. Instead, efforts by local democrats to deflect the progression toward mainland-style governance are derided as unpatriotic and blocked at every step.

The moral of this story is that the two-systems solution is not what it seems from a distance. Although carefully written and promoted to obscure the endgame, Hong Kong’s Basic Law authorizes all the means necessary to facilitate integration within the national political system and that process is well advanced. Even the staid South China Morning Post has begun slipping lines about full integration by 2047 into its editorials. Letters-to-the-editor also occasionally question the value of an independent Western-style judiciary or electoral system when neither will be needed “after 2047.” The forecast is a given but such real-life implications have yet to be elaborated.

Hopefully, therefore, international promoters of Hong Kong’s two-systems formula will avoid the temptation of years past and refrain from recommending it as an easy way out of the Taiwan stalemate. Given the economic interests at stake and Beijing’s success in leveraging these for political advantage, Washington and the KMT will probably be inclined to accommodate Beijing’s unification goal. The danger is that international public opinion will contribute to the sense of inevitability by rallying behind the two-systems solution without fully realizing that it is now being used for the purpose intended:  as a means of finessing the transition to one-system one-party rule.    

Suzanne Pepper is a Hong Kong-based American writer. Her books include Civil War in China:  The Political Struggle, 1945-49 and Keeping Democracy at Bay on Hong Kong’s political development.

07/01/2009